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Any solution to the problem of voluntary cooperation in international climate policy does not 
only have to overcome the notorious free rider incentives, but also has to comply with the 
notions of “equity” and “justice”. Inequality aversion, i.e. the disutility of having a higher or 
lower payoff than others, is one important concept in this area of other-regarding preferences.  
In this paper, we  analyse the implications of inequality  aversion for international climate 
policy. For this purpose, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion 
to the context of full heterogeneity, i.e. players in our public good model are allowed to differ 
with respect to their initial endowments, their  degrees of inequality  aversion and to their 
marginal benefits and costs of contributions to the public good. Hence, the model developed 
in this paper captures all essential aspects of real world international climate policy. There, 
heterogeneous countries face the opportunity to contribute to the production of the global 
public good climate protection. 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: Firstly, we derive simple analytical conditions that 
allow  us  to  identify  the  circumstances  under  which  perfectly  heterogeneous  countries  are 
willing to contribute to the public good climate protection. Secondly, we check whether these 
conditions hold for important negotiating parties in the real world, e.g. China, the EU, Russia 
and the US. The main theoretical result is that a country’s benefit has to exceed some critical 
value as a necessary condition for contributing to the global public good climate protection, 
whereby this critical value depends on a country’s degree of inequality aversion, its position 
in the payoff ranking, its costs of contributing and other countries’ benefits. It is exactly this 
condition  that  is  used  for  the  empirical  test.  We  employ  data  from  Nordhaus’  RICE,  a 
regionalised impact assessment model, to estimate empirical benefits and costs of climate 
protection for different regions. The data input for the degree of inequality aversion is taken 
from the experimental economics literature. We then show that for major countries involved 
in international climate policy such as China, the US and Russia, the necessary condition for 
contributing is violated – at least for the time horizon until 2055. Thus, although inequality 
aversion theoretically enhances the prospects for voluntary cooperation in providing public 
goods, it is advisable not to overestimate its potential for overcoming cooperation problems in 
real world climate policy.   2 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Eine Lösung des Kooperationsproblems in der globalen Klimapolitik erfordert neben einer 
deutlichen  Senkung  der  Treibhausgasemissionen  eine  von  den  Beteiligten  als  „fair“ 
empfundene Aufteilung der mit der Emissionsreduktion verbundenen Lasten. Ein wichtiges 
Konzept  zur  Abbildung  von  Fairnesspräferenzen  ist  Ungleichheitsaversion,  d.h.  der 
Nutzenverlust, der dadurch entsteht, dass man eine höhere oder niedrigere Auszahlung als 
andere Akteure hat. 
In  diesem  Papier  untersuchen  wir  die  Auswirkungen  von  Ungleichheitsaversion  auf  die 
internationale Klimapolitik. Hierzu erweitern wir das Ungleichheitsaversion-Modell von Fehr 
und Schmidt (1999) auf den Fall vollständiger Heterogenität. Akteure in dem untersuchten 
Öffentliches-Gut-Spiel  unterscheiden  sich  hinsichtlich  ihrer  Anfangsausstattung,  dem 
Ausmaß an Ungleichheitsaversion und den Nutzen und Kosten des Beitrags zum öffentlichen 
Gut. Damit bildet das untersuchte Modell alle Aspekte der realen Klimapolitik ab. Auch hier 
haben  heterogene  Akteure  (Länder)  die  Möglichkeit,  Beiträge  zur  Erstellung  eines 
öffentlichen Guts (Klimaschutz) zu leisten. 
Im Papier wird zunächst theoretisch gezeigt, welche kritische Bedingung erfüllt sein muss, 
damit  heterogene  Akteure  bereit  sind,  zum  öffentlichen  Gut  Klimaschutz  beizutragen.  Im 
Anschluss wird überprüft, ob die hergeleitete kritische Bedingung für wichtige Akteure in der 
realen Klimapolitik, z.B. China, EU, Russland und USA, erfüllt ist. Als kritische Bedingung 
kann hergeleitet werden, dass der Nutzen aus dem Beitrag zum Klimaschutz für ein Land 
einen  kritischen  Wert  übersteigen  muss.  Dieser  kritische  Wert  ist  abhängig  von  der 
Ungleichheitsaversion  des  Landes,  seiner  Position  in  der  Rangordnung  der  Pro-Kopf-
Einkommen,  seinen  Kosten  des  Beitrags  und  dem  Nutzen  aller  anderen  Länder.  Diese 
kritische Bedingung wird dann einem empirischen Test unterzogen. Hierzu nutzen wir Daten 
des  regionalisierten  Klima-Ökonomie-Modells  RICE  von  William  Nordhaus.  RICE  liefert 
regionalisierte Nutzen und Kosten für unterschiedliche Klimaschutzszenarien. Der Dateninput 
für Ungleichheitsaversion stammt aus der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. Wir können 
als zentrales Resultat zeigen, dass für wichtige Verhandlungsparteien in der internationalen 
Klimapolitik wie China, USA und Russland die kritische Bedingung für den Beitrag zum 
öffentlichen Gut Klimaschutz nicht erfüllt ist – zumindest bis 2055. Das bedeutet: Obwohl 
Ungleichheitsaversion theoretisch die Kooperationschancen bei der Bereitstellung öffentlicher 
Güter erhöht, ist in der realen Klimapolitik nicht damit zu rechnen, dass sich die Aussichten 
auf Kooperation durch die Berücksichtigung von Ungleichheitsaversion deutlich verbessern.   3 
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1 Introduction 
Any solution to the problem of voluntary cooperation in international climate policy does not 
only have to overcome the notorious free rider incentives, but also has to comply with notions 
of “equity” and “justice” (e.g. Posner and Weisbach 2010). Several important parties involved 
in the climate talks, like the G77/China, strive for an “equitable burden sharing”. Within the 
EU, notions of equity also played a role when the internal burden sharing for EU members 
was  fixed  after  the  adoption  of  the  overall  EU  reduction  target  of  8%  under  the  Kyoto 
Protocol.  Within  the  academic  sphere,  studies  like  Lange  et  al.  (2007)  provide  empirical 
support for the idea that equity is an important issue in the negotiation arena of climate policy. 
Furthermore, negotiators may be truly motivated by some notion of equity: Dannenberg et al. 
(2010) find empirical support for the hypothesis that climate negotiators show relatively high 
degrees of inequality aversion as a prominent example of equity preferences. Moreover, broad 
evidence from experimental economics suggests that a significant fraction of subjects is to 
some  extent  guided  by  equity  concerns  such  as  inequality  aversion.  Subjects  reject  high 
amounts of money in the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982, Oosterbeek et al. 2003), and they 
make  positive  contributions  in  the  dictator  game  (Kahneman  et  al.  1986,  Engel  2010). 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) provide strong empirical evidence for the explanatory power 
of  inequality  aversion.  Their  study  demonstrates  that  the  typical  observation  of  declining 
contributions  in  repeated  public  good  games  can  easily  be  explained  since  players  gain 
knowledge of their co-players’ displayed inequality aversion in previous rounds, on which 
future beliefs can be based.1 
Inequality aversion has been introduced as an analytical concept in economics by Fehr and 
Schmidt  (1999,  hereafter  called  F&S).  In  their  highly  influential  paper,  they  assume  that 
actors derive disutility from unequal outcomes. Thereby, players may show an aversion to 
both disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. The interesting implication of this idea is 
that it provides an easy and elegant explanation of why players should voluntarily cooperate 
in  a  social  dilemma.  The  reason  is  quite  simple:  If  a  player  is  sufficiently  averse  to 
advantageous inequality, he will simply abstain from exploiting the free rider opportunity. 
The cooperation-enhancing effect of this type of preferences has already been shown for a 
linear public good game by F&S themselves. Lange and Vogt (2003) show that this effect 
                                                 
1 However, these observations may be ambiguous. As Lange et al. (2010) point out, the use of equity criteria in 
climate  negotiations  may  be  motivated  by  pure  economic  self-interest.  I.e.  the  preference  for  some  equity 
criterion may to a large extent be explained with considerations of minimising the costs of implementing treaty 
obligations. In this paper, we take the idea of inequality aversion seriously, i.e. we do not assume that it can be 
perfectly explained by purely strategic considerations that influence the bargaining outcome.   5 
also  appears  in  a  more  complicated  two-stage  N-player  coalition  game.  Their  analysis  is, 
however,  restricted  to  symmetric  countries.  Lange  (2006)  points  out  that  more  severe 
intricacies in sustaining cooperative outcomes are the consequence if the players are allowed 
to be heterogeneous. 
In  this  paper,  we  extend  the  F&S  model  of  inequality  aversion  to  the  context  of  full 
heterogeneity, i.e. players in our non-linear public good model are allowed to differ with 
respect to their initial endowments, their degrees of inequality aversion and – this is new – to 
their  marginal  benefits  and  costs  of  contributions  to  the  public  good.  Hence,  the  model 
developed  in  this  paper  captures  all  essential  aspects  of  real  world  international  climate 
policy. There, countries face the opportunity to contribute to the production of the global 
public good climate protection. However, countries in the real world are obviously highly 
diverse with respect to their economic wealth as well as their benefits and costs of climate 
protection. Thus, a specific degree of inequality aversion may have different effects on the 
countries’ incentives to contribute. 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: Firstly, we derive simple analytical conditions that 
allow  us  to  identify  the  circumstances  under  which  perfectly  heterogeneous  countries  are 
willing to contribute to the public good climate protection. Secondly, we check whether these 
conditions hold for important negotiating parties in the real world, e.g. the US, the EU, Russia 
and China. We are primarily concerned with the time horizon until 2055 – since this time 
period  dominates  the  current  climate  negotiations.  The  main  theoretical  result  is  that  a 
country’s benefit has to exceed some critical value as a necessary condition for contributing to 
the global public good climate protection, whereby this critical value depends on a country’s 
degree of inequality aversion, its position in the payoff ranking, its costs of contributing and 
other countries’ benefits. It is exactly this condition which is used for the empirical test. We 
employ  data  from  Nordhaus’  RICE  model,  a  regionalised  impact  assessment  model,  to 
estimate empirical benefits and costs of climate protection for different regions. The data 
input  for  the  degree  of  inequality  aversion  is  taken  from  the  experimental  economics 
literature. We then show that for major countries involved in international climate policy, the 
necessary  condition  for  contributing  is  violated.  Thus,  although  inequality  aversion 
theoretically  enhances  the  prospects  for  voluntary  cooperation  in  providing  public  goods 
drastically,  it  is  advisable  not  to  overestimate  its  potential  for  overcoming  cooperation 
problems in real world climate policy.   6 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide the non-linear public good model 
with heterogeneous players and derive the necessary condition for contributing to the public 
good. In Section 3, we investigate the prospects for voluntary cooperation in climate policy 
using  the  derived  theoretical  framework  and  empirically  estimated  values  for  inequality 
aversion, and benefits and costs from climate policy. In Section 4, we discuss the results and 
draw a conclusion. 
 
2 The model 
In  this  paper,  we  deal  with  a  non-linear  public  good  model  in  order  to  investigate  the 
prospects for an international climate agreement. In this model, actors are endowed with some 
initial allocation which can be kept for private consumption or be devoted to the production of 
some public good. Let there be  N i ,..., 1 =  players and consider an arbitrary player j. Each 
player is endowed with some amount of private good  j z . Let  j j j x z q - =  denote the amount 
of private good that player j devotes to the production of the public good y. Hence,  j x  is the 
amount of the initial endowment that player j keeps for private consumption. The public good 
y is produced according to some non-linear production function  ( ) Q g y =  where  ∑ = =
N
j j q Q
1 . 
The players’ payoffs consist of the amounts of the private and the public good they consume, 
i.e.  ( ) y a p x y x j j j j j + = , p . The parameter  j p  denotes the marginal opportunity costs for the 
investment in the public good, i.e. the loss of private consumption if player j decides to devote 
one  more  unit  of  endowment  to  the  public  good  y.  The  parameter  j a   measures  the 
productivity  of  player  j’s  individual  contribution  and  the  term  ' g a j   is  j’s  benefit  from 
investing one more unit of endowment to the public good. With respect to parameters  j a  and 
j p  and the production function, we assume  ' > > ' ∑ g a p g a j j j j , where  ' ∑ g a
j j  measures 
the marginal social benefit from an investment to the public good by player j. The payoff for 
player j then results as  
( ) ( ) Q g a p q z j j j j j + - = p   (1). 
Note  that,  if  j  decides  to  invest  one  unit  of  endowment  to  the  public  good,  he  creates  a 
positive externality: All other players receive an additional payoff according to their marginal 
benefit. Players who act economically rational and selfish will not take these externalities into   7 
account. Since the marginal social benefit of contributing  ' ∑ g a
j j  exceeds the marginal costs 
of costs of contributing  j p , which exceed the private marginal benefit of contributing  ' g a j , 
the amount of the public good provided collectively in Nash equilibrium ( 0 =
Nash
j q ) falls 
short of the efficient level ( j
eff
j z q = ). 
However, the result sketched out above only holds for standard preferences. F&S introduce 
the  idea  that  actors  may  be  averse  to  inequality.2  They  formalise  the  idea  of  inequality 
aversion  by  introducing  the  following  utility  for  player  j,  given  the  payoffs  for  all  other 
players i: 

























- =p p p   (2). 
For  0 , > j j b a , (2) implies that player j derives disutility from inequality. The second term 
represents disutility from disadvantageous inequality (in case of  j i p p > ), while the third term 
reflects  disutility  from  advantageous  inequality  (in  case  of  i j p p > ).  With  respect  to 
parameter  j b , F&S assume in addition  1 < j b .3 
Now let us apply this utility function to the non-linear public good game. In this paper, we 
allow for full heterogeneity of all players, i.e. the players differ with respect to their degrees 
of inequality aversion, they may face different initial allocations and, most importantly, the 
players are characterised by varying benefits and costs of contributions to the public good. Let 
us consider an arbitrary player j within the payoff order generated by the vector of initial 
endowments and the vector of contributions by all players  N i ,..., 1 = . Player j’s utility is 
generally given by 
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2 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also propose an influential model of inequality aversion. Our choice of F&S’ 
model is simply motivated by its greater mathematical simplicity. 
3 The justification for this restriction is quite plausible. For simplification, assume a two-player case and that one 
player has a higher payoff than the other. Allowing  1 = b  would mean that the first player is prepared to throw 
one euro away in order to reduce his advantage.  1 > b  implies that he is even willing to throw away more than 
one euro.   8 
Thereby, h denotes players who rank above player j in the payoff hierarchy and l denotes 
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 is the total 
advantageous  inequality  weighted  by  j b   and  normalised  by  1 - N .  By  inserting  payoffs 
according to (1) and (3), we can derive player j’s utility as 
( )= l h j j q q q U , ,   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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We are interested in the condition under which player j decides to contribute voluntarily to the 
production of the public good. To make contributing worthwhile, it must not pay off to 
deviate from any given positive contribution level  0 > j q . In particular, it must not pay off to 
contribute less than  j q . Thus, let us consider an arbitrary deviation D  below  j q . The utility 
in the case where player j chooses to deviate is given as 
( )= D - l h j j q q q U , ,  
     
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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We use the following approximation for  ( ) D - Q g : 
( ) ( ) ( )
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The utility from deviating results as follows:   9 
( )= D - l h j j q q q U , ,
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                                            (6). 
Now, we have to compare (4) and (6). Clearly, contributing pays off if 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ - D ¢ + - ¢ D + D - D + ¢ - D - >
Û D - >
h l
l j j j h j j j j j j j
l h j j l h j j
a a g a a g l p h p g a p N
q q q U q q q U
b a b a 1 0
, , , ,
  (7). 
(7) can be solved for several variables. If we treat  j a ,  j b ,  j p  and  j a  as given parameters, it 
might be interesting to solve the term for h. This allows us to investigate how the position 
within  the  payoff  hierarchy  affects  the  decision  to  contribute  or  not.  Recognising  that 
1 - - º h N l , we get 
( )( )( )
( )( )
0   if      ,
1 1 ) (
> ¢ - º
+ ¢ -
- ¢ - - - ¢ -
<
∑ ∑
g a p h
g a p
g a p N g a a
h j j
crit








  (8) 
and 
( )( )( )
( )( )
0   if      ,
1 1 ) (
< ¢ - º
+ ¢ -
- ¢ - - - ¢ -
>
∑ ∑
g a p h
g a p
g a p N g a a
h j j
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  (8’). 
(8) tells us that player j will only choose to contribute if h is sufficiently low, i.e. player j 
ranks sufficiently high in the payoff hierarchy. However, a second case may also occur: If the 
marginal benefit exceeds the marginal costs, then player j will contribute only if he ranks 
sufficiently  low.  Surprisingly,  this  case  is  empirically  of  particular  relevance  when  we 
consider a time horizon in climate policy until 2100. We will come back to this point later. 
For our purposes, it is interesting to have a closer look at the RHS of (8) and (8’). Consider   10 
the first case, i.e.  0 > ¢ - g a p j j  . We are looking for a lower bound of 
crit h . Clearly, for (8) to 
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  (9). 
(9) is a necessary condition for contributing. It states that player j will choose to contribute to 
the public good if his marginal benefit from contributing,  ' g aj , is high enough, i.e. exceeds 
the critical marginal benefit 
1 crit
j b . (9) is well suited to easily study how changes in parameter 









), while with increasing  j b  (9) becomes less restrictive. The last conjecture can 
easily be confirmed by looking at the corresponding partial derivative:  
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Consequently,  if  players  are  highly  averse  to  advantageous  inequality,  their  incentives  to 
contribute  will  increase.  On  the  other  hand,  stronger  disadvantageous  inequality  makes 
voluntary cooperation in the production of public goods more difficult. Moreover, (9) is also 
suited to discuss the role of the position within the payoff hierarchy. Obviously, the more 
players rank above (or below) player j in the payoff hierarchy, the higher (or lower) the value 
∑h h a  and the more (or less) demanding is (9).  
The intuition behind the comparative statics is quite easy: Deviating downward from some 
positive  contribution  level  leads  to  a  higher  absolute  payoff  for  the  deviating  player.  So 
ceteris paribus, the disadvantageous inequality is reduced. The higher  j a , the stronger this 
effect  is.  On  the  other  hand,  deviating  creates  additional  advantageous  inequality.  Thus, 
higher values of  j b  make it less worthwhile to deviate. 
Now consider the second case, i.e.  0 < ¢ - g a p j j . Then, for condition (8’) to hold, the RHS 
must not exceed  1 - N , the corresponding upper bound of 
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  (10). 
Obviously, the comparative statics run in the same direction as for (9). 
 
3 Prospects for voluntary cooperation in climate policy 
In this section, we use  our model developed in Section 2 to investigate the prospects for 
voluntary cooperation in international climate policy. It is well known that preferences like 
the  ones  proposed  by  F&S  have  the  potential  to  greatly  facilitate  cooperation  in  the 
production of public goods.4 For example, Lange and Vogt (2003) show that even the grand 
coalition of all countries of the world can be stabilised as a Nash equilibrium in a two-stage 
coalition formation game, if all players are sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality. Yet 
the question of whether inequality aversion really helps to ease cooperation in practice has to 
be answered empirically. In this section, we use conditions (9) and (10) in order to investigate 
whether real world countries have incentives to contribute to the global public good climate 
protection. 
Remember condition (9). It states that – given the values for the aversion parameters  j a  and 
j b  and given a country’s position within the payoff hierarchy (i.e. given the values of ∑h h a  
and ∑l l a ) – the country’s marginal benefit,  ' g aj , must exceed the critical value on the RHS 
of (9), 
1 crit
j b , in order to contribute. Hence, in order to evaluate (9) and (10) empirically, we 
need values for  j a  and  j b  as well as for  ' ∑ g a
h h  and  ' ∑ g a
l l . 
 
3.1 Estimates for inequality aversion 
There are only few studies so far which try to estimate empirical values for a  and  b . F&S 
themselves use data from Roth (1995) and others and derive the distribution for a  and  b  
according to the observed behaviour of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game. 
Parameter  j a   can  be  derived  directly  from  the  responder’s  acceptance  behaviour.  The 
distribution over a  is shown in Table 1. If a proposer does not know the parameter  j a  of the 
                                                 
4 The use of equity preferences in the context of international negotiations at government level can be justified 
by simple political economy reasoning: Governments or their delegates in international climate negotiations may 
be forced to take equity considerations into account if their pivotal voter at home shows corresponding concerns.   12 
responder but believes that the probability distribution over a  is the one given in Table 1, 
then the responder’s optimal offer can be derived as a function of his inequality parameter 
j b . Given the actual offers in ultimatum games, the distribution of  b  can be computed as 
depicted in Table 1.5 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Inequality Parameters as Assumed by F&S 
distribution of a ’s    distribution of  b ’s 
5 . 0 0 < £a   30 %    235 . 0 < b   30 % 
1 5 . 0 < £a   30 %    5 . 0 235 . 0 < £ b   30 % 
4 1 < £a   30 %    5 . 0 ³ b   40 % 
¥ < £a 4   10 %       
833 . 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = a     288 . 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = b  
Notes:  The  median  values,  ] 5 . 0 [ α   and  ] 5 . 0 [ β ,  are  derived  by  linear  approximation 
according to the intervals F&S propose (p. 843-844). In their Table III, F&S assume for 
both  parameters  few  points  in  the  density  with  mass.  This  leads  to  85 . 0 = a   and 
315 . 0 = b . See Section 3.4 for a sensitivity analysis.   
 
We  use  the  distribution  shown  in  Table 1  in  order  to  compute  the  median  by  linear 
approximation of the empirical cumulated density function. This leads to  833 . 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = a  and 
288 . 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = b . We proceed with these values in our analysis and assume that each region has 
the same degree of inequality aversion.6 A sensitivity analysis of our results with respect to 
the chosen values for a  and b  is given in Section 3.4. 
 
3.2 Estimates for benefits and costs 
Our estimates for benefits and costs of climate protection are based on the impact assessment 
model RICE (“regional integrated model of climate and the economy”) developed by William 
Nordhaus (Nordhaus 2010). RICE views climate change in the framework of the economic 
growth theory. In a standard neoclassical optimal growth model, the society invests in capital 
goods, thereby reducing the current consumption so as to increase consumption in the future. 
RICE modifies the growth model to include climate investments. The capital stock of the 
conventional model is extended to include investments in the environment (natural capital). 
                                                 
5 F&S show that the distribution in Table 1 is consistent with the behavior in a broad range of experiments. 
6  This  assumption  seems  to  be  warranted  since  in  Dannenberg  et  al.  (2010)  the  estimated  values  for  F&S 
parameters of negotiators in international climate policy do not differ across different regions of the world.   13 
Emissions  reductions  in  the  extended  model  are  analogous  to  capital  investments  in  the 
mainstream  model.  That  is,  concentrations  of  greenhouse  gases  (GHGs)  are  modelled  as 
“negative natural capital” and emissions reductions as lowering the quantity of that negative 
capital. Emissions reductions lower the current consumption, but, by preventing economically 
harmful climate change, increase consumption possibilities in the future. The model divides 
the world into 12 regions. Some are large countries, such as the United States or China; others 
are large multi-country regions, such as the European Union or Latin America. Each region is 
assumed to have a well-defined set of preferences, represented by a social welfare function, 
and to optimise its consumption, GHG policies and investment over time. The social welfare 
function is increasing in the per capita consumption of each generation, with diminishing 
marginal utility of consumption. The importance of a generation’s per capita consumption 
depends on its relative  size. The relative importance of different  generations is measured 
using a pure rate of time preference, and the curvature of the utility function is given by the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. These parameters are calibrated to ensure 
that the real interest rate in the model is close to the average real interest rate and the average 
real return on capital in real-world markets. The model contains both a traditional economic 
sector, like those found in many economic models, and geophysical relationships designed for 
climate-change modelling. 
Based  on  RICE,  several  scenarios  on  future  climate  policy  can  be  investigated.  For  our 
purposes, the scenarios “Baseline” and “Optimal” are relevant. In Baseline, no global climate 
change  policies  are  adopted,  i.e.  complete  inaction  on  international  climate  policies  is 
assumed.  In  Optimal,  climate  change  policies  maximise  economic  welfare  with  full 
participation by all nations starting in 2010 and without climatic constraints. Thus, in this case 
the  most  efficient  climate-change  policies  are  assumed.  Thereby,  efficiency  involves  a 
balancing of the abatement costs and the benefits of reduced climate damages.  
There seems to be some inconsistency between RICE and our public good model. While 
RICE assumes governments to maximise welfare functions based on neoclassical standard 
preferences, actors in our model are partly motivated by inequality aversion. Note, however, 
that we only use RICE to obtain empirical estimates for the benefits and costs.  
By considering the Optimal versus the Baseline scenario, we assume a rather optimistic case 
of climate policy where the difference between national benefits and costs is large. Any more 
ambitious mitigation policy, e.g. a mitigation policy aiming  at the 2-degree target, would 
necessarily lead to a less favourable benefit-cost ratio (Nordhaus 2008). Thus, by considering   14 
the Optimal scenario from RICE, we give our critical conditions (9) and (10), respectively, a 
rather good chance of being fulfilled.  
Table 2 shows benefits and abatement costs for the 12 regions in RICE as differences between 
the Optimal and Baseline scenarios for two different time horizons, one until 2055 and the 
other until 2100. The benefit values for region j correspond to  ' g a j  in our model, since we 
consider a discrete choice between only two scenarios. Analogously, abatement cost values 
for region j correspond to  j p . For example, given a time horizon until 2055, the US has 
90.1 bn$2005  of  higher  benefits  and  148.9 bn$2005  of  higher  abatement  costs  in  Optimal 
compared  to  Baseline.  This  leads  to  a  benefit-cost  ratio  of  0.61.  Since  with  longer  time 
horizon, benefits from abatement (i.e. reduced damages of climate change) will increase, the 
corresponding benefit-cost ratio for a time horizon until 2100 is 1.06. For the EU, mitigation 
benefits are higher (101.4 bn$2005) and the abatement costs are lower (72.4 bn$2005), leading to 
a more favourable benefit-cost ratio of 1.40 for the time horizon until 2055. 
For the time horizon until 2055, only a few regions will gain a net benefit in full cooperation: 
the EU, India, Africa, and Latin America. These are the regions that will be significantly hit 
by an unmitigated climate change in the medium term. On the other hand, major emitting 
countries such as the US, Russia and China have a benefit-cost ratio that is below one. Given 
the standard preferences, these regions will lose in full cooperation, since their benefits from 
mitigation are smaller than their abatement costs. In other words, the fundamental incentives 
to participate in an international climate agreement are not given. 
 
Table 2: Benefits and Abatement Costs in RICE 
bn $ 2005  Region 
  CHI  US  RUS  JPN  EU  IND  LatA  AFR  MidE  EurA  OHI  Other 
Benefits through 
   2055  95.1  90.1  8.9  21.4  101.4  93.6  57.4  68.9  82.6  7.0  32.0  72.0 
   2100  370.4  308.2  28.4  64.3  340.3  370.0  215.9  337.9  316.8  26.9  106.2  328.4 
Abatement costs through 
   2055  302.5  148.9  43.7  22.2  72.4  83.6  52.3  35.9  95.5  27.8  44.7  80.2 
   2100  578.9  292.0  80.7  38.6  142.3  198.6  120.0  99.6  225.8  55.5  82.3  212.8 
Benefit-cost ratio 
   2055  0.31  0.61  0.20  0.96  1.40  1.12  1.10  1.92  0.86  0.25  0.72  0.90 
   2100  0.64  1.06  0.35  1.67  2.39  1.86  1.80  3.39  1.40  0.48  1.29  1.54 
Notes: Benefits and costs are differences between the scenarios Optimal and Baseline in RICE (Nordhaus 
2010 and RICE model runs available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/RICEmodels.htm). The RICE model 
contains 12 regions: China (CHI), United States (US), Russia (RUS), Japan (JPN), European Union (EU), 
India (IND), Latin America (LatA), Africa (AFR), Middle East (MidE), Eurasia (EurA), Other high income 
countries (OHI), Other. Benefits and costs are present values using the consumption weighted international 
real interest rate in RICE.     15 
 
3.3 Evaluation 
The  main  question  of  the  paper  is,  whether  inequality  aversion  is  able  to  improve  the 
incentives to cooperate in international climate policy. We can answer this question by using 
our  estimates  from  Sections 3.1  and  3.2  in  order  to  evaluate  whether  (9)  and  (10)  hold 
empirically.  Note  that  the  payoff  hierarchy  within  the  public  good  game  is  determined 
endogenously.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  depends  on  two  determinants,  the  initial 
endowment on the one hand and the amount contributed to the public good on the other hand. 
Thus, we cannot rule out that the ex-ante position of a country (determined solely by the 
given initial endowments) may change due to the contribution decision. But this implies that 
there  is  a  huge  number  of  possible  payoff  hierarchies  that  would  principally  have  to  be 
considered. We abbreviate the analysis by taking only the best case scenario into account, i.e. 
the constellation of parameters that makes the RHS of (9) or (10) achieve their minimum 
values. Obviously, this is the case when the country under consideration ranks highest in the 
payoff hierarchy (i.e. h = 0).  
 
Table 3: Critical Values and Benefits 
    CHI    US    RUS    JPN    EU    IND 
through   ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b  
2055    95.1  279.1   90.1  125.3   8.9  17.2   21.4  -3.9   101.4  63.4   93.6  74.5 
2100    370.4  489.3   308.2  256.3   28.4  -21.7   64.3  -0.7   340.3  107.0   370.0  163.7 
    LatA    AFR    MidE    EurA    OHI    Other 
through   ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b     ' g a j  
crit
j b  
2055    57.4  42.6   68.9  26.4   82.6  71.7   7.0  1.2   32.0  19.0    72.0  56.0 
2100    215.9  82.9   337.9  64.3   316.8  190.2   26.9  -47.0   106.2  43.6   328.4  177.3 
Notes: Benefits,  ' g a j , and critical values, 
crit
j b , according to (9) or (10) under the best case scenario 
(h = 0). Used values for F&S parameters are  833 . 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = a  and  288 . 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = b  (F&S 1999).  
As an example, the critical value for China in 2055, 
crit
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Table 3 shows the critical values and the marginal benefits for the time horizons until 2055 
and 2100 using the median values from F&S’ distribution of inequality aversion parameters. 
Consider first the time horizon until 2055. As we can clearly see, the empirically estimated 
marginal  benefits  do  not  exceed  the  critical  values  for  important  countries  in  climate 
negotiations. For China, the US and Russia, the critical condition (9) for contributing to the   16 
public good climate protection is violated. Remember that this result has been obtained under 
best case assumptions, i.e. the country under consideration ranks on top of the global payoff 
hierarchy. Hence, the difference between  ' g a j  and 
crit
j b  would be even bigger for countries 
like China or Russia when more realistic positions in the payoff order are considered. On the 
other hand, benefits of regions such as the EU, Africa and Japan are high enough to offer 
incentives  for  climate  protection.  This  result  may  partly  explain  why  the  EU  has  been 
particularly engaged in climate policy and pushed for international agreements so actively in 
the past. 
Comparing  the  values  without  inequality  aversion  (Table 2)  and  with  inequality  aversion 
(Table 3), we find that for Japan, the Mid East, EurA, OHI and Other, inequality aversion has 
a positive impact on the incentives to contribute to the global public good climate protection. 
For all other countries, the initial decision with standard preferences remains the same if we 
take inequality aversion into account. 
A  brief  look  at  the  data  for  2100  reveals  that  the  prospects  for  cooperation  in  climate 
protection are much more favourable in this case. There is only one country, China, which has 
no incentives to contribute. In general, for all countries or regions, the necessary conditions 
for contributing are much less demanding. Note, however, that conditions (9) and (10) are 
only  necessary  conditions  for  contributing  to  climate  protection.  In  order  to  investigate 
whether countries really would be willing to enter into an international agreement on climate 
mitigation, a more sophisticated analysis would be necessary, e.g. within a coalition formation 
framework.  The  public  good  model  is  well  suited  to  demonstrate  that  regarding  the  time 
horizon until 2055, fundamental incentives for climate protection are very limited. But it also 
leaves open a number of important questions which certainly have an impact on a country’s 
decision to contribute or not, e.g. the country’s size or the composition of a climate coalition 
and burden sharing within such coalition. 
 
3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
We use the available estimates for F&S parameters in order to prove the robustness of our 
results. Firstly, F&S themselves present mean values for the assumed distribution in Table 1 
( 85 . 0 = a   and  315 . 0 = b ).  Secondly,  Blanco  et  al.  (2011)  use  modified  ultimatum  and 
dictator games to obtain values for inequality aversion parameters. They present maximum-
likelihood estimations of the parameters ( 91 . 0 ˆ = a  and  38 . 0 ˆ = b ). However, as Blanco et al.   17 
use student subjects (N = 61), the question of how far it is appropriate to apply these values to 
the context of international climate policy is well worth asking. Thirdly, Dannenberg at al. 
(2010) try to figure out empirical values for  j a  and  j b  by asking participants (N = 155) of 
the international climate talks. For this purpose, they conducted an online experiment with 
individuals who had been involved in international climate policy. The experiment consisted 
of two simple non-strategic games resembling the ultimatum and dictator games, suited to 
measure individual inequality aversion as captured in the model by  F&S.7 They  find that 
participants, on average, show a considerable aversion to advantageous inequality, while the 
aversion to disadvantageous inequality is moderate. The obtained mean values are  394 . 0 = a  
and  561 . 0 = b . While the median for the weight of the disadvantageous inequality aversion 
strongly deviates from the mean ( 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = a ), the median for the weight of the advantageous 
inequality aversion is rather similar to the mean ( 53 . 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = b ). Remarkably, the study cannot 
confirm significant differences with respect to geographical variety, i.e. negotiators from all 
regions  of  the  world  show  rather  similar  degrees  of  inequality  aversion.  Moreover, 
Dannenberg et al. (2010) asked their participants to imagine that decisions in their experiment 
had to be made by members of a delegation of their country on a Conference of the Parties 
(COP) or in a meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies. By and large, respondents expected their 
country delegates to act in a more selfish way than themselves. This means that the values of 
j a  and  j b  obtained in this study can be regarded as upper bounds. 
If we use the mean values from Table 1 (F&S 1999), no changes with respect to the incentives 
to  contribute  can  be  observed  (Scenario  S1,  Table 4  in  the  appendix).  If  we  adopt  the 
inequality aversion parameters obtained in Blanco et al. (2011), most of our results from 
Section 3.3 remain robust. As Table 4 (Scenario S2) shows, based on a best case analysis we 
still  can  conclude  that  China  and  the  US  have  no  incentives  to  contribute  to  climate 
protection.  Table 4  (Scenarios  S3  and  S4)  also  shows  the  results  if  we  adopt  aversion 
parameter values from Dannenberg et al. (2010). We still can safely conclude that China has 
definitely no incentive to participate in international climate agreements. For other countries, 
it is not possible to draw safe conclusions based on a best case scenario.  
                                                 
7 In the modified ultimatum game used by Blanco et al. (2011), each subject reacts to an actual proposal of his or 
her co-player, i.e. there is a distinct element of strategic interaction in this game. In the modified ultimatum game 
used by Dannenberg et al. (2010), however, there is no direct interaction between both subjects and no room for 
strategic considerations. As the individual inequality aversion is estimated without strategic interaction between 
players, it is not surprising that the median value for  a  is very low and the corresponding mean value is 
strongly influenced by some outliers on the right tail of the distribution. Thus, one might be skeptical whether 
the a  values of Dannenberg et al. (2010) are a correct measure of the aversion to disadvantageous inequality.   18 
Note, however, that Dannenberg et al. (2010) obtained an exceptionally high value for  b . 
Remember the notion of this parameter: If, e.g.,  5 . 0 = β  in a two-player case, then a player 
would be indifferent between keeping one dollar of income for himself or giving the dollar 
away. We can hardly imagine that  5 . 0 > b  characterises the behaviour of countries engaged 
in climate policy. Perhaps the study suffers from a self-selection bias, and strongly equity-
oriented negotiators are overrepresented in their sample. Moreover, the obtained value for a  
is exceptionally low, and, particularly, the study finds  a b > . The bulk of empirical evidence, 
however,  suggests  that  people  suffer  more  from  disadvantageous  than  from  advantageous 
inequality (Loewenstein et al. 1989). 
 
4 Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  we  elaborated  on  the  idea  that  the  behaviour  of  countries  in  international 
environmental  policy  may  be  motivated  by  considerations  of  inequality  aversion.  We 
extended the model of inequality aversion introduced by F&S to a context where players may 
differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributing to a global non-linear public 
good climate protection. Hence, our model captures all essential real world dimensions of 
heterogeneity  in  the  field  of  international  climate  policy:  Countries  obviously  differ  with 
respect to their economic wealth and to their expected damages from climate change and their 
abatement costs. We show that a country can only be expected to contribute to the global 
public  good  climate  protection  if  its  benefit  is  high  enough.  We  evaluate  this  condition 
empirically  by  taking  estimates  for  benefits  and  costs  from  the  impact  assessment  model 
RICE and inequality aversion parameters from  the experimental economics literature. We 
show that empirically, the critical condition for contributing fails to hold for major players in 
international climate policy except the EU and Japan. Our results are quite robust with respect 
to variations of the degree of inequality aversion. Even with extreme values, at least China, 
the world’s biggest CO2 emitter, never contributes. Hence, although inequality aversion is a 
theoretically appealing way to solve the cooperation problem in social dilemmas, we should 
be careful not to overestimate its potential for solving real world negotiation problems in 
climate policy. 
Finally, we would like to discuss briefly which policy lessons might be learned from this 
paper.  From  the  viewpoint  of  international  climate  policy,  the  question  of  how  voluntary 
cooperation in climate protection can be achieved still remains. Our model suggests that a 
country’s  benefit  plays  a  crucial  role  compared  to  all  other  parameters,  particularly  the   19 
degrees of inequality aversion. Hence, an accurate measurement of a country’s benefits and 
costs from climate policy is a prerequisite for the country to make a rational decision. Hence, 
it is highly important that governments are well-informed about the expected damages facing 
their country. The views on this topic are heavily influenced by the progress in climate-related 
research. A better understanding of the climate system, its changes and its impact on societies 
as well as adaptation options may alter the views on damages. For example, if new insights 
from science suggest that the probability for catastrophic climatic events is increasing, this 
may change the benefit-cost ratio and, hence, also influence a country’s contribution decision 
in  the  public  good  game.  On  the  other  hand,  if  e.g.  the  abatement  costs  decrease  due  to 
technical progress, this may also change a country’s decision to contribute or not to climate 
protection.  Hence,  it  might  be  worthwhile  to  think  about  appropriate  research  policies  to 
promote technical progress which would make emissions reductions cheaper. 
There is a third less obvious determinant of the benefits. When calculating future climate 
damages, economists typically discount future values. Taking into account that the damages 
of  an  unmitigated  climate  change  are  significant  in  the  remote  future,  the  choice  of  the 
discount factor crucially affects the benefit: The higher the discount factor, the lower the 
expected  damages  and,  thus,  the  lower  the  corresponding  benefits  from  climate  policy. 
Although  economists  widely  agree  with  Nordhaus’  (2008)  view  that  discount  factors  are 
appropriate which are consistent with the returns on real world capital markets, the choice of 
the discount rate is not a purely scientific problem but involves a normative decision. This 
may give some leeway for the benefit-cost ratio due to ethical reasoning.8 Furthermore, there 
are strong arguments for choosing a discount rate near the very lowest expected rate of return 
in the long run (Weitzman 1999). Future research would have to improve our knowledge 
about  the  determinants  of  the  benefit-cost  ratio  of  climate  policy  and  the  corresponding 







                                                 
8 It would be an easy task to calculate discount rates necessary for making contributing worthwhile in our model.   20 
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Appendix 
Table 4: Critical Values and Benefits – Sensitivity Analysis 
through    ' g a j  
1 ,S crit
j b  
2 ,S crit
j b  
3 ,S crit
j b  
4 ,S crit
j b     ' g a j  
1 ,S crit
j b  
2 ,S crit
j b  
3 ,S crit
j b  
4 ,S crit
j b  
    CHI    US 
2055    95.1  275.9  267.1  237.3  228.7    90.1  122.1  113.2  83.24  74.5 
2100    370.4  476.8  442.8  328.4  295.0    308.3  253.3  246.7  171.3  200.4 
    RUS    JPN 
2055    8.9  13.6  3.5  -30.2  -40.1    21.4  -7.4  -17.3  -50.5  -60.2 
2100    28.4  -35.7  -74.5  -204.8  -242.9    64.3  -3.9  -11.1  -93.9  -62.0 
    EU    IND 
2055    101.4  62.6  61.0  42.1  49.4    93.6  73.8  72.1  53.0  60.3 
2100    340.3  104.0  97.6  23.1  51.8    370.0  160.7  154.4  80.8  109.2 
    LatA    AFR 
2055    57.4  41.8  40.1  39.8  27.6    68.9  25.6  23.9  17.7  11.7 
2100    215.9  79.8  73.0  -5.2  24.9    337.9  61.3  54.9  -19.7  9.1 
    MidE    EurA 
2055    82.6  68.5  59.5  29.1  20.3    7.0  -2.4  -12.5  -46.4  -56.2 
2100    316.8  187.2  180.7  105.5  134.5    26.9  -61.0  -99.8  -230.2  -268.2 
    OHI    Other 
2055    32.0  15.5  5.8  -26.9  -36.5   72.0  52.7  68.3  12.7  3.7 
2100    106.2  40.4  33.3  -48.2  -16.8   328.4  174.3  167.9  93.1  121.9 
Notes:  
Benefits,  ' g a j , and critical values, 
crit
j b , according to (9) or (10) under the best case scenario (h = 0). 
Scenario S1: Values used for F&S parameters are  85 . 0 = α  and  315 . 0 = b  (F&S 1999). S2: Values used 
for F&S parameters are  91 . 0 ˆ = a  and  38 . 0 ˆ = b  (Blanco et al. forthcoming). S3: Values used for F&S 
parameters  are  0 ] 5 . 0 [ = a   and  53 . 0 ] 5 . 0 [ = b   (Dannenberg  et  al.  2010).  S4:  Values  used  for  F&S 
parameters are  394 . 0 = a  and  561 . 0 = b  (Dannenberg et al. 2010).   
 